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Abstract
We study cooperative games associated with a communication struc-
ture which takes into account a level of communication between play-
ers. Let us consider an undirected communication graph : each node
represents a player and there is an edge between two nodes if the cor-
responding players can communicate directly. Moreover we suppose
that a weight is associated with each edge. We compute the so-called
strength of this graph and use the corresponding partition to determine
a particular coalition structure. The strength of a graph is a measure
introduced in graph theory to evaluate the resistance of networks un-
der attacks. It corresponds to the minimum on all subsets of edges of
the ratio between the sum of the weights of the edges and the number
of connected components created when the set of edges is suppressed
from the graph. The set of edges corresponding to the minimum ratio
induces a partition of the graph. We can iterate the calculation of the
strength on the subgraphs of the partition to obtain reﬁned partitions
which we use to deﬁne a hierarchy of coalition structures. For a given
game on the graph, we build new games induced by these coalition
structures and study the inheritance of convexity properties, and the
Shapley value associated with them.
Keywords: communication networks, coalition structure, cooperative
game.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider communication games introduced by Myerson in
1977 [10]. These games are cooperative games (N, v) deﬁned on the set
of vertices N of an undirected graph G = (N,E), where E is the set of
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edges. v is the characteristic function of the game, v : 2N → IR, A → v(A)
and veriﬁes v(∅) = 0. For every coalition A ⊆ N , we consider the induced
restricted graph GA := (A,E(A)). The set of edges E(A) of GA is the set
of edges e = {i, j} ∈ E such that i and j are in A. We denote by A/G the
set of connected components of GA. Myerson deﬁned the restricted game v
on N , also called a point game, by :
(1) v(A) =
∑
F∈A/G
v(F ), for all A ⊆ N.
Observe that it is suﬃcient to deﬁne v on A/G. The graph G describes
how the players of N can communicate: e = {i, j} ∈ E if and only if the
players i and j can directly communicate. For every coalition A ⊆ N , a
set F ∈ A/G is deﬁned as a maximal subcoalition of A such that all pairs
of players i, j in F can communicate by a path in GA starting from i and
ending at j. Myerson provided an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley
value of these games. The new game v takes into account how the players of
N can communicate according to the graph G. Owen [11] proved that if v
is superadditive then v is also superadditive without any assumption on G.
A graph G = (N,E) is cycle-complete if every set of nodes corresponding
to a cycle in G induces a complete subgraph of G. Van den Nouweland and
Borm in 1991 [14] proved that if G is cycle-complete (particularly if G is
cycle-free) and if v is convex, then v is also convex. Thus nice properties of
the underlying game v are inherited by the restricted game v.
In the present paper we associate weights or strengths with the edges
of the graph. Each edge-strength u(e) of e = {i, j} ∈ E can be seen as a
measure of the resistance or of the level of communication between players
i and j. The model we propose takes more insight in the combinatorial
structure of the graph than previous ones by using the concept of strength
of a graph. This concept has been introduced by Gusﬁeld [9] for graphs
with edges of unit strengths and generalized to arbitrary edge-strengths by
Cunningham [4]. The strength σ(G,u) of G is deﬁned by:
(2) σ(G,u) := min
A⊆E
u(A)
k(A) − k(∅)
where k(A) is the number of connected components of the graph G =
(N,E \ A) (and k(∅) the number of components of G). σ can be seen
as a measure of the resistance of the network G under attack. Indeed, if we
suppose that someone wants to destroy as much as possible the communica-
tion possibilities, and that the eﬀort required to delete a link between two
players is proportional to the strength of this link, then σ(G,u) is the min-
imal average eﬀort one has to make to augment the number of components
as much as possible by deleting a subset A of edges of G. The partition of N
in connected components corresponding to the graph G = (N,E \A) and to
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a minimizer A in the deﬁnition of σ provides a decomposition of N into con-
nected components which are strongly coherent in the following sense: they
take into account both the strength u(e) of the links of communication and
the combinatorial structure of the communication graph G. Besides, if B is
such a component then the strength of the induced graph GB = (B,E(B))
is larger than the strength of G.
We propose several new restricted games associated with (N, v) and the
strength u. For the ﬁrst one, we consider a chain of partitions of N . Partition
P1 is the partition of N corresponding to the strength of G. Then, for each
A ∈ P1, the strength of GA = (A,E(A)) provides a new partition of A and
therefore a reﬁnement P2 of the partition P1 and so on. Now for a given
A ⊆ N , we construct a partition P(A) of A by ﬁlling A as much as possible
using at ﬁrst subsets of P1, and then subsets of P2, and so on. The new
restricted game v˜ is deﬁned by :
(3) v˜(A) :=
∑
F∈P(A)
v(F ).
One of the main interest of this deﬁnition is to provide natural examples
where the results of Algaba, Bilbao and Lopez [1] and Faigle [5] about convex
intersecting systems apply immediately to the family F := P1 ∪ P2 ∪ · · · ∪
Pn. As a consequence we prove that convexity of the game (N, v) implies
convexity of the new game v˜, and therefore the Shapley value of v˜ is still in
the core of v˜. Thereafter, we construct another restricted game, called the
main game associated with the strength, in the same spirit as the graph-
restricted game of Myerson [10]. We do not use anymore the preceding chain
of partitions but, for every A ⊆ N , we consider a subset S ⊆ E(A) which
is a minimizer of the strength of GA = (A,E(A)) and the corresponding
partition P(A) of A we obtain after deleting S. We deﬁne v by
(4) v(A) :=
∑
F∈P(A)
v(F ).
That is, in Myerson’s deﬁnition we have replaced the partition of A into
connected components by a partition of A into strongly coherent connected
components associated with the strength of the graph GA = (A,E(A)).
The article is organized as follows. We deﬁne in Section 2 the partitions
associated with the strength of a graph. We study in Section 3 the inheri-
tance of superadditivity and convexity for the game v˜. In Section 4 we give
a simple counterexample to the inheritance of superadditivity (and therefore
of convexity) for the main game v associated with the strength. Then we
deﬁne a slightly weaker condition than convexity in Section 5 and establish
necessary conditions on the edge-weights to have inheritance of this prop-
erty. In Section 6 we prove that these conditions are also suﬃcient in the
case of cycle-free graphs. Finally we compute the Shapley value of the game
v in the case of cycle-free graphs in Section 7.
3
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2 The partition associated with the strength of a
graph
Let G = (N,E) be a connected graph and let u : E → IR+ be a weight
function on the set E of edges. The strength of G is deﬁned by:
(5) σ(G,u) := min
A⊆E
u(A)
k(A)− 1
where k(A) is the number of connected components of the graph G = (N,E\
A). When G and u are ﬁxed and that there is no ambiguity, we simply
denote by σ the strength σ(G,u) of G. The computation of the strength is
a polynomial problem [4].
Let r be the rank function associated with G, i.e., for all A ⊆ E, r(A)
denotes the size of a maximal forest included in A. The rank function is
submodular :
(6) r(A ∪B) + r(A ∩B) ≤ r(A) + r(B) ∀A,B ⊆ E.
As G is a connected graph, we have r(E) = |V |−1 and r(E\A) = |V |−k(A).
Thus k(A)− 1 = r(E)− r(E \ A) and:
(7) σ(G,u) = min
A⊆E
u(A)
r(E)− r(A) .
We will deﬁne the strength of a not necessarily connected graph by this
last formula because this last deﬁnition naturally extends to the case of a
matroid or a polymatroid (cf [7, 6, 13]).
Let us deﬁne the auxiliary function f by, ∀A ⊆ E:
(8)
f(A) := u(A)− σ(k(A) − 1)
= u(A) + σr(A)− σr(E).
As r is submodular and u is additive, f is submodular. By deﬁnition of σ,
∀A ⊆ E, f(A) ≥ 0 and f(A) = 0 with A = ∅ is equivalent to u(A)k(A)−1 = σ,
that is, A realizes the minimum of the strength. Thus A = ∅ realizes the
minimum of the ratio in the deﬁnition of the strength if and only if A realizes
the minimum of the submodular function f . It is a classical result that the
family of sets which realizes the minimum of a given submodular function
is closed under union and intersection. We give a short proof of this result
for completeness.
Let us consider two subsets A and B of E satisfying f(A) = f(B) = 0. We
have f(A ∪ B) ≥ 0 and f(A ∩ B) ≥ 0. Therefore, as f is submodular, we
obtain 0 ≤ f(A ∪ B) + f(A ∩ B) ≤ f(A) + f(B) = 0. Thus f(A ∪ B) =
f(A ∩ B) = 0. Hence the family {A ⊆ E ; f(A) = 0} is closed under
4
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union and intersection, and there exists a maximal element Amax in F and
a minimal one Amin in F . If Amin = ∅, we have:
(9) σ =
u(Amax)
k(Amax)− 1 =
u(Amin)
k(Amin)− 1
and for all A ⊆ E such that σ = u(A)k(A)−1 we have:
(10) Amin ⊆ A ⊆ Amax.
For example, if the graph G is a tree and if all weights are equal to 1, every
subset A = ∅ is a minimizer of the strength:
σ =
|A|
k(A)− 1 =
|A|
|A| = 1.
We have Amax = E and Amin = ∅ and there are as many partitions of N
associated with the strength as nonempty subsets A of E. Especially each
edge e is a minimal minimizer but there is no smallest minimizer.
3 A ﬁrst family of restricted games associated with
the strength of a graph
Let (N, v) be a game on the set N of vertices of the graph G = (N,E) and
let u : E → IR+ be a weight function on the set of edges. For a family F
of subsets of N and a subset A of N , we denote by F(A) the elements of F
included in A.
(11) F(A) := {F ∈ F ;F ⊆ A}.
We consider on the set of players N a hierarchy of coalition structures, that
is, a ﬁnite number of partitions P0,P1, . . . ,Pm of N such that P0 = {N},
Pm = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}} is the singleton coalition structure, and:
(12) Pm ≤ Pm−1 ≤ · · · ≤ Pi+1 ≤ Pi ≤ · · · ≤ P1 ≤ P0
where Pi+1 ≤ Pi means that every block of Pi+1 is a subset of a block of Pi.
P1 is one of the partitions of N given by the strength of the graph G. For
every A ∈ Pi, we consider the subgraph GA = (A,E(A)). We select a
minimizer of σ(GA) and consider the corresponding partition of A. This
partition provides the blocks of Pi+1 which are subsets of A. Let F be the
family
(13) F = P0 ∪ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm.
5
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.59
We deﬁne a new game v˜ on N by:
(14) v˜(A) :=
∑
F∈F(A), F maximal
v(F ) for all A ∈ 2N .
The family of sets F obviously satisﬁes the following property. For all A,B ∈
F , one and only one of the following properties is veriﬁed: A ∩ B = ∅, or
A ⊂ B or B ⊂ A or A = B. We say that F is a nested family. Therefore F
is also an intersecting system1, F is also weakly union-closed2 and therefore
F ∪ ∅ is also a partition system3 (cf. [1, 5, 8]).
We recall that a game (N, v) is superadditive if, for all A,B ∈ 2N such
that A ∩ B = ∅, v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B). A game (N, v) is convex if the
function v is supermodular i.e., for all A,B ∈ 2N , v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) ≥
v(A) + v(B). We say v is F-superadditive if for all A,B ∈ F such that
A ∩B = ∅, we have:
(15) v(A ∪B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
Observe that for such games, since F is a nested family, we have for all
A,B ∈ F :
(16) v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
A game v deﬁned on an intersecting system (N,F) and satisfying condition
(16) is called an intersecting convex game (cf. [5]). Algaba et al. [1] and
Faigle [5] have proved:
Theorem 1. If (N,F , v) is an intersecting convex game, then the restricted
game (N, 2N , v˜) deﬁned by:
v˜(A) =
∑
F∈F(A), F maximal
v(F )
for all A ⊆ N , is a convex game.
This last theorem applies to any preceding nested family F we have
constructed by (11), (12), (13) and (14) using the strength of a graph, and
therefore the following theorem is a corollary of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. If F is a family of subsets of N associated with the strength of
a graph G(N,E) by means of the preceding hierarchy of coalitions structures,
and if (N,F , v) is an F−superadditive game on N , then the restricted game
(N, 2N , v˜) is a convex game.
1If A and B ∈ F and if A ∩B = ∅ then A ∩B and A ∪ B are in F .
2If A and B are in F and if A ∩B = ∅ then A ∪B ∈ F .
3For all A ∈ F , the maximal subsets F ∈ F(A) form a partition of A, and the singletons
are in F .
6
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We give a direct proof following the method of A. Van den Nouweland
and P. Borm (1991) [14].
Proof. For all A,B ∈ N such that A∩B = ∅, we have v(A∪B) ≥ v(A)+v(B).
Let us now consider A,B and i ∈ N such that A ⊂ B ⊆ N \ {i}. We have
to prove v˜(A ∪ {i}) − v˜(A) ≤ v˜(B ∪ {i}) − v˜(B). By deﬁnition, we have:
(17) v˜(A) =
∑
C∈F(A), C maximal
v(C)
and
(18) v˜(A ∪ {i}) =
∑
C∈F(A∪{i}), C maximal
v(C).
Let us denote by C(i) the unique maximal set C ∈ F(A ∪ {i}) such that
i ∈ C. Let us denote by C the family:
(19) C := {C ∈ F(A), C maximal in F(A) and C ⊂ C(i)}.
Observe that as i /∈ A, C(i) = {i} ∪ (⋃C∈C C) (If C ∈ F , C ⊂ A ∪ {i}, C is
maximal in F(A∪ {i}) and i /∈ C, then C ⊂ A and C is maximal in F(A).)
Observe also that if C ∈ F(A ∪ {i}), C is maximal and C ⊂ C(i) then
C ∩C(i) = ∅ (partition) and C ∈ F(A) with C maximal in F(A). Hence:
(20) v˜(A ∪ {i}) − v˜(A) = v(C(i))−
∑
C∈C
v(C).
Analogously, we deﬁne D(i) as the maximal set D in F(B ∪ {i}) such that
i ∈ D and :
(21) D := {D ∈ F(B);D maximal in F(B),D ⊂ D(i)}.
Then D(i) = {i} ∪ (⋃D∈DD) and :
(22) v˜(B ∪ {i}) − v˜(B) = v(D(i)) −
∑
D∈D
v(D).
Hence, it remains to prove that:
(23) v(C(i)) −
∑
C∈C
v(C) ≤ v(D(i)) −
∑
D∈D
v(D).
We want now to prove that for every C ∈ C, there exists one and only one
D ∈ D such that C = D. As A ⊂ B, A ∪ {i} ⊂ B ∪ {i} and therefore
C(i) ⊆ D(i). Hence, for all C ∈ C, there exists precisely one D ∈ D
such that C ⊆ D. D ∩ C(i) = ∅ because D ∩ C(i) ⊃ C = ∅. D ⊇ C(i)
contradicts i /∈ D. Therefore D ⊂ C(i). But i /∈ D and C(i) ⊂ A ∪ {i},
7
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then D ⊂ A. But D is maximal in F(B), hence D ⊂ A is maximal in
F(A). As C ⊂ D ⊂ A and C and D are maximal in F(A), we have
C = D. We can now number the elements of C and D in such a way that
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cs}, D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dt} with s ≤ t and Cr = Dr for all
r, 1 ≤ r ≤ s. Superadditivity of the game (N, v) implies :
v
(
{i} ∪
s⋃
r=1
Dr ∪
t⋃
r=s+1
Dr
)
≥ v
(
{i} ∪
s⋃
r=1
Dr
)
+
(
t∑
r=s+1
v(Dr)
)
.
Then :
v
(
{i} ∪
⋃
D∈D
D
)
−
∑
D∈D
v(D) ≥ v
(
{i} ∪
s⋃
r=1
Dr
)
−
(
s∑
r=1
v(Dr)
)
.
As Dr = Cr for all r, 1 ≤ r ≤ s, we obtain:
v
({i} ∪⋃D∈DD)−∑D∈D v(D) ≥ v ({i} ∪⋃sr=1 Cr)−∑sr=1 v(Cr)
≥ v ({i} ∪⋃C∈C C)−∑C∈C v(C)
That is precisely (23).
4 The main restricted game associated with the
strength of a graph
We deﬁne a second game v on 2N by:
(24) v(A) =
∑
F∈P(A)
v(F ) for all A ⊆ N
where P(A) is a partition of A associated with the strength of the graph
GA = (A,E(A)). As we have already noticed in Section 2, there may be
several minimizers for the strength of a given graph and therefore several
possible partitions. We have, for each non empty subset A of N , to choose a
partition P(A) among all possible partitions. Thereafter we will select the
maximal subset Amax of E(A) we can delete to achieve the minimum in the
deﬁnition of the strength of GA (as deﬁned in Section 2), and denote by
Pmax(A) the corresponding partition. We consider the main restricted game
v on N deﬁned by:
v(A) =
∑
F∈Pmax(A)
v(F ), for all A ⊆ N.
For example, if G is a tree with all edge weights equal to 1, then for every
subset A ⊆ N , Pmax(A) is the singletons partition of A and v is the trivial
restricted game:
v(A) =
∑
i∈A
v({i}).
8
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We are going to study conditions on the edge-weights to have inheritance
of the superadditivity and of the convexity. First of all we give a simple
counterexample to the inheritance of superadditivity from a given game v
to v in general. Let us consider the graph of Figure 1 where we specify two
subsets S and T of nodes and two nodes a and b. In Figure 2 we represent
5
1
3
1
5
5
2
4
2
a
b
S T
Figure 1:
at the top the graphs induced by S ∪ T , S, and T and at the bottom the
same graphs after the deletion of the maximal minimizer of the respective
strengths. Let us consider the game v deﬁned by v(A) =
{
1 if A ⊇ {a, b}
0 otherwise
.
GS∪T
5
1
3
1
5
5
2
4
2
a
b
GS
1
3
1
a
b
GT
4
2
2
a
b
a
b
Figure 2:
Then v is superadditive but v(S ∪ T ) = 0 < 1+ 0 = v(S) + v(T ). Therefore
v is not superadditive.
Hence there is also no conservation of convexity in general (in the pre-
ceding example, the unanimity game v is convex but v is not superadditive
and therefore not convex).
5 Necessary conditions
In this part we establish necessary conditions on the weight vector u for the
inheritance of the convexity from the original communication game v to the
new restricted game v. For any given subset A of N , the unanimity game
9
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uA : 2N → IR is deﬁned by:
(25) uA(S) =
{
1 if S ⊇ A,
0 otherwise.
Actually, we are going to establish necessary conditions for a slightly weaker
condition than convexity. We say that a subset A ⊆ N is connected if the
induced graph GA = (A,E(A)) is connected. The family F of connected
subsets of N is obviously weakly union-closed. A game v on 2N is said to
be F-convex if for all A,B ∈ F such that A ∩B = ∅, we have:
(26) v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
Of course convexity implies F-convexity. The F-convexity implies also the
following condition. If a game v on 2N is F-convex then, ∀A,B ⊆ N and
i ∈ N such that A ⊆ B ⊆ N \ {i} and B and A ∪ {i} are connected, we
have:
(27) v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A).
We ﬁrst establish that, in the case of a graph without cycles, we have equiv-
alence of these two conditions.
Theorem 3. Let G = (N,E) be a forest and let F be the family of connected
subsets of N . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(28) v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B), ∀A,B ∈ F s.t. A ∩B = ∅.
(29)
v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A), ∀A,B ∈ F s.t. A ⊆ B ⊆
N \ {i} and A ∪ {i} ∈ F .
The result is well known if F = 2N . The proof is the same as Schrijver’s
[12] (p. 767) with minor changes (as we are dealing with connected subsets
of N). At ﬁrst we have to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let G = (N,E) be a graph without cycles. Let S and T be
two connected subsets of N such that T \ S = ∅. Then there exists a node
t ∈ T \ S which is a leaf node of T . Especially, T \ {t} is still connected.
Proof. Let T
′ ⊆ T \ S be a connected component of T \ S. At ﬁrst, let us
assume |T ′ | = 1, T ′ = {t} and let us assume t is not a leaf node of T . Then
there exists two edges e1 = {t, t1} and e2 = {t, t2} in E with t1 = t2. As
|T ′ | = 1 and t ∈ T ′ , t1 and t2 are in S. As S is connected, there exists a
path γ from t1 to t2 in S. Therefore we obtain a cycle (e1, γ, e2) in G and
we get a contradiction. Let us now assume |T ′ | ≥ 2. As T ′ is a tree, T ′ has
at least two leaf nodes t1 and t2. Let us now suppose neither t1 nor t2 are a
10
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leaf node of T . Then there exists two edges e1 = {s1, t1} and e2 = {s2, t2}
with s1 and s2 ∈ T \ T ′ . As T ′ is a connected component of T \ S, s1 and
s2 belong to S. As S is connected, there exists a path γ in S from s1 to s2
and, as T
′
is connected, there exists a path γ
′
in T
′
from t1 to t2. But then
e1 ∪ γ ∪ e2 ∪ γ′ forms a cycle and we get a contradiction. Therefore at least
one of t1 or t2 is a leaf node of T . Of course if t ∈ T \ S is a leaf node of T ,
then T \ {t} is still connected.
Proof of Theorem 3. We assume (29) is satisﬁed and we establish (28) by
induction on |AΔB|. If |AΔB| = 1, then we have A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A and (28)
is trivially satisﬁed. If |AΔB| = 2, we may suppose |A\B| = 1 and |B\A| =
1 (otherwise A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A and (28) is trivial). Setting S := A∩B, T := A
and B \A = {i}, (28) is equivalent to v(T ∪{i})+ v(S) ≥ v(T )+ v(S ∪{i}),
which is equivalent to (29) applied to S and T and therefore (28) is satisﬁed.
Let us observe that S is connected because A and B are connected and G
has no cycle and that S ∪ {i} = B is connected. If now |AΔB| ≥ 3, we may
assume by symmetry of A and B that |B \ A| ≥ 2. Applying Lemma 4, we
can ﬁnd t ∈ B \ A such that B \ {t} is still connected. By induction, we
apply (28) to the pair {A,B \ {t}}:
(30) v(A ∪ (B \ {t}))− v(B \ {t}) ≥ v(A)− v(A ∩B)
because |AΔ(B \ {t})| = |AΔB| − 1 < |AΔB|. By induction we now apply
(28) to the pair {A ∪ (B \ {t}), B}:
(31) v(A ∪ (B \ {t}) ∪B)− v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ (B \ {t}))− v(B \ {t})
because |(A ∪ (B \ {t}))ΔB| = |A \ B| + 1 < |A \ B| + |B \ A| = |AΔB|.
Let us observe that A ∪ (B \ {t}) is connected because A and B \ {t} are
connected and their intersection is A∩B = ∅. As A∪ (B \{t})∪B = A∪B,
(31) may be written as:
(32) v(A ∪B)− v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ (B \ {t})) − v(B \ {t}).
(30) and (32) imply v(A ∪B)− v(B) ≥ v(A) − v(A ∩B).
Let γ = (e1, e2 . . . , em) be an elementary path in G with ei = {i, i + 1}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and such that the subgraph induced by the set of vertices
{1, 2, . . . ,m + 1} forms a tree. We denote by uj the weight of ej .
Proposition 5. Let G = (N,E) be an arbitrary graph. If there is inheri-
tance of the F-convexity from v to v, then for all paths γ = (e1, e2 . . . , em)
in G, such that its vertices deﬁne a tree in G, and for all i, j, k such that
1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ m, the edge-weights uj satisfy:
(33) uj ≤ max(ui, uk).
Besides, if u1 = min1≤i≤m ui (resp. um = min1≤i≤m ui), then the sequence
(ui)mi=1 is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing).
11
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Thus we have a property of convexity on the edge-weights along every
path in G which deﬁnes a tree.
Proof. Suppose there exists i, j, k such that 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ m and uj >
max(ui, uk). We will construct a convex game v on N such that v is not
convex. At ﬁrst we make several reductions of this situation. We can ﬁx ei
and ek and select an edge ej such that uj is maximal for all ej between ei
and ek. We now ﬁx such an ej and we select a maximal index i such that
i < j and ui < uj. In the same way, we select k minimal such that j < k
and uk < uj. For all l ∈]i, k[ we now have by construction ui < ul = uj
and uk < ul = uj i.e. max(ui, uk) < ul = uj, i.e. the weights are constant
between ui and uk. We can now shrink the path γ to its restriction from
i to k + 1 and suppose that i = 1 and k = m. If necessary we can also
exchange γ with the inverse path starting from m + 1 and ending at 1 to
have u1 ≥ um. Therefore we can suppose u1 ≥ um.
At ﬁrst we consider the case u1 > um. We are in the following situation:
(34) ∀l, j ∈]1,m[, ul = uj > u1 > um.
We deﬁne the sets A = {2, 3, . . . ,m}, B = {1, 2, . . . ,m} as represented in
Figure 3 and we denote now by i the vertex m + 1. We have A ⊂ B ⊂
N \ {i} and A,B and A ∪ {i} are connected. As γ is a tree, the strength
1 2 m i
u1 u2 um−1 umB
A
Figure 3:
of any subtree induced by a subset S of vertices of γ corresponds to the
smallest edge-weight in E(S). Pmax(S) is obtained by deleting all edges in
E(S) minimizing the weight in E(S). Therefore, as a consequence of (34),
we have Pmax(A ∪ {i}) = {A, {i}} and Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {B, {i}}. Thus
v(A ∪ {i}) = v(A) + v(i) and v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B) + v(i). The F-convexity of
v would imply v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) i.e.:
(35) v(B)− v(B) ≥ v(A)− v(A).
Because of (34), u1 is the smallest weight of edges in E(B). Thus Pmax(B) =
{A, {1}} and v(B) = v(A)+v(1). Following (34), all edges of E(A) have the
same weight, so we have to delete all edges of A to obtain Pmax(A). Thus
Pmax(A) = {{2}, {3}, · · · , {m}} and v(A) =
∑
k∈A v(k). (35) becomes:
(36) v(B)− v(A) − v(1) ≥ v(A) −
∑
k∈A
v(k).
12
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Now if we take v = uA then v is supermodular, but as B ⊃ A, (36) becomes
equivalent to 1− 1− 0 ≥ 1− 0, a contradiction.
We now consider the case u1 = um < ul = uj for all l, j ∈]1,m[ and
A,B, i as before. As u1 = um is the smallest weight of edges of B ∪ {i},
we have to delete e1 and em. Therefore Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {A, {1}, {i}} and
v(B ∪ {i}) = v(A) + v(1) + v(i). In the same way, we have also v(B) =
v(A) + v(1), v(A ∪ {i}) = v(A) + v(i), and v(A) = ∑k∈A v(k). Therefore
the inequality v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) is equivalent to:
(37)
∑
k∈A
v(k) ≥ v(A).
If we take v = uA, then (37) is equivalent to 0 ≥ 1, a contradiction.
Remark 1. If u1 (resp. um) is the smallest weight of the edges of γ, then
the condition of convexity of the ui’s means that the sequence (ui)mi=1 is
non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing) as ui ≤ max(u1, ui+1) = ui+1 (resp.
ui+1 ≤ max(ui, um) = ui) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
Remark 2. We cannot restrict the convexity condition to only every 3-
uple of consecutive edges ui ≤ max(ui−1, ui+1), 2 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, because of
the obvious counter-example: u2 = u3 > max(u1, u4). Nevertheless u2 =
max(u1, u3) and u3 = max(u2, u4).
Now we show there exists another necessary F-convexity condition asso-
ciated with every induced subgraph (A,E(A)) of G corresponding to a star.
A star Sk corresponds to a tree with one internal node and k leaves. We ﬁrst
establish the result for stars with three leaves. The generalization to stars
of greater size is immediate. We consider a star S3 with vertices {1, 2, 3, 4}
and edges e1 = {1, 2}, e2 = {1, 3} and e3 = {1, 4}.
Proposition 6. Let G = (N,E) be an arbitrary graph. If for every F-
convex game v on N we have inheritance of the F-convexity from v to the
restricted game v, then for every induced star of type S3 of G, the weights
u1, u2, u3 of the three edges satisfy:
u1 ≤ u2 = u3 after renumbering the weights if necessary.
Proof. Suppose it is not true. At ﬁrst we suppose u1 < u2 < u3. We
consider the situation of Figure 4 where A = {1, 4}, B = {1, 3, 4} and
i = 2. By deleting the edge of minimal weight we obtain successively:
Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {B, {i}}, Pmax(B) = {A, {3}}, Pmax(A ∪ {i}) = {A, {i}}
and Pmax(A) = {{1}, {4}}. Therefore v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B) + v(i), v(B) =
v(A) + v(3), v(A ∪ {i}) = v(A) + v(i) and v(A) = v(1) + v(4). To get a
contradiction, we have to construct a supermodular function v such that the
following inequality is satisﬁed:
(38) v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) > v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B)
13
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31 2
4
u2
u3
u1
B
A
Figure 4:
which is equivalent to 2v(A) > v(B) + v(1) + v(4) − v(3). If we consider
v = uA then v is supermodular, but (38) is satisﬁed and therefore v is
not F-convex. Therefore the three weights cannot be all distincts. Two
of them, for instance u2 and u3, have to be equal. Thus we now suppose
u1 > u2 = u3. We consider now the situation of Figure 5 where A = {1, 2},
3
1 2
4
u2
u3
u1
A
B
Figure 5:
B = {1, 2, 3} and i = 4. Then we obtain v(B ∪ {i}) = v(A) + v(3) + v(i),
v(B) = v(A) + v(3), v(A ∪ {i}) = v(A) + v(i) and v(A) = v(1) + v(2). (38)
is now equivalent to
(39) v(A)− v(1) − v(2) > 0.
Now if we take v = uA, v is supermodular and (39) is satisﬁed. Therefore v
is not F-convex.
Remark 3. For an induced star with n edges e1, e2, . . . , en the weights verify
u1 ≤ u2 = u3 = · · · = un after renumbering the edges if necessary.
We can easily obtain necessary conditions for inheritance of the convexity
in the case of a chordless cycle in G induced by m vertices with m ≥ 3.
Denote by 1, 2, . . . ,m the nodes of a chordless cycle C and by e1, e2, . . . , em
the edges with ei = {i, i + 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and em = {1,m}.
If m = 3, it is easy to see that for every choice of the weights u1, u2, u3
we have conservation of the convexity. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, i = 3 and consider
∅ = A ⊆ B ⊆ N \{i}. If A = B then v(B∪{i})−v(B) = v(A∪{i})−v(A). If
A ⊂ B, we can suppose A = {2} and B = {1, 2} as represented in Figure 6.
Then v(A) = v(2), v(A ∪ {i}) = v(2) + v(i) and v(B) = v(1) + v(2). If
v(B∪{i}) = v(B)+v(i) then v(B∪{i})−v(B) = v({1, 2})+v(i)−v(1)−v(2).
14
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i1 2
e3 e2
e1 AB
Figure 6:
If v(B ∪ {i}) = v({1, i}) + v(2) then v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) = v({1, i}) − v(1).
As v is supermodular, we have in these two cases v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) ≥ v(i).
If v(B ∪ {i}) = v(1) + v(2) + v(i) then v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) = v(i). Therefore
in all cases we have v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A).
For m ≥ 4 the inheritance of the convexity implies strong restrictions on
the edge-weights.
Proposition 7. If C = (v1, e1, v2, e2, . . . , vm, em, v1) is an induced chordless
cycle of G = (N,E) with m ≥ 4 and if the F-convexity property is inherited
from v to v for all F-convex game v on N , then, after renumbering the edges
if necessary, we have
u1 ≤ u2 ≤ u3 = · · · = um.
Proof. After a permutation of the edges if necessary we can suppose u1 ≤ ui
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Applying Proposition 5 to the path (e2, e3, . . . , em)
e3
e4 = em
e1
e2
Figure 7:
of G we have ui ≤ max(u2, um) for all i, 2 ≤ i ≤ m. We may suppose
max(u2, um) = um after a permutation of e2, . . . , em if necessary, that is:
(40) u1 ≤ ui ≤ um,∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
We now apply Proposition 5 to the path (e1, em, em−1, . . . , e4, e3). As u1 is
the smallest weight, the sequence of weights is non-decreasing:
(41) u1 ≤ um ≤ um−1 ≤ · · · ≤ u4 ≤ u3.
(40) and (41) imply um = um−1 = · · · = u4 = u3.
Now we construct another example proving that the conditions of con-
vexity of weights of the Propositions 5 and 6 are not suﬃcient to im-
ply the inheritance of the convexity of games (even of the F-convexity).
We take all weights equal to 1. We add to a 3-cycle {e1, e2, e3} with
15
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1
3 4
e1
e2
e3
e5
e4
A
B
Figure 8:
e1 = {1, 2}, e2 = {2, 3} and e3 = {3, 1}, two edges e4 = {1, 4} and
e5 = {1, 5}. We take A = {1, 2, 3}, B = {1, 2, 3, 4} and i = 5. We obtain
Pmax(A) = {{1}, {2}, {3}}, Pmax(A ∪ {i}) = {A, {i}}, Pmax(B) = {A, {4}}
and Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {A, {4}, {i}}. Therefore v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) = v(i) and
v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) = v(A) + v(i) − v(1) − v(2) − v(3). v is not F-convex if
v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) > v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B), i.e. if:
(42) v(A) > v(1) + v(2) + v(3).
If we take v = uA, v is supermodular but (42) is satisﬁed therefore v is not
F-convex.
We now study the inheritance of the superadditivity.
Proposition 8. If for every unanimity game uS on N , uS is superadditive
then for all subset A ⊆ N and all i ∈ N \ A, the partition Pmax(A) of A is
a reﬁnement of the restriction of Pmax(A ∪ {i}) to A.
More precisely, the proposition means that if Pmax(A) = {A1, A2, . . . , Am}
and Pmax(A∪{i}) = {A′1∪{i}, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
p}, then if A
′
1 = ∅, {A
′
1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
p}
is another partition of A, and if A
′
1 = ∅, {A
′
2, . . . , A
′
p} is another partition
of A and for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Aj is a subset of one and only one set A′k.
Proof. For any given subset S of N the unanimity game uS is supermodular
and therefore uS is superadditive, hence uS(A ∪ {i}) ≥ uS(A) + uS(i). As
uS(i) ≥ 0, it implies
(43) uS(A ∪ {i}) ≥ uS(A).
Let us consider Pmax(A) = {A1, A2, . . . , Am} and Pmax(A ∪ {i}) = {A′1 ∪
{i}, A′2, . . . , A
′
p}. For every 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m, we have Aj ∩ Ak = ∅ for j = k
and therefore uAk(Aj) = 0, and for j = k, uAk(Ak) = 1. Thus uAk(A) =∑m
j=1 uAk(Aj) = uAk(Ak) = 1. Using (43), with S = Ak, we obtain uAk(A∪
{i}) ≥ 1. Therefore, we have uAk(A
′
1 ∪ {i}) +
∑p
j=2 uAk(A
′
j) ≥ 1. As the
function uAk only takes values 0 or 1, we necessarily have for at least one A
′
j
16
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(j ≥ 2), uAk(A
′
j) = 1 or uAk(A
′
1 ∪ {i}) = 1. Therefore, for at least one A
′
j
we have Ak ⊆ A′j (following the deﬁnition of uAk). As the A
′
j ’s are disjoint,
there exists for each Ak one and only one A
′
j such that Ak ⊆ A
′
j. This proves
that (Ak) is a reﬁnement of the partition (A
′
j) of A.
For A ⊆ B ⊆ N , we can now repeatedly apply Proposition 8 adding
successively to A every element i ∈ B \A. We have proved:
Theorem 9. If for every unanimity game uS on N the main restricted
game uS is superadditive, then for all subsets A ⊆ B ⊆ N , Pmax(A) is a
reﬁnement of the restriction of Pmax(B) to A.
The converse is true but we can establish a stronger result:
Theorem 10. If for all subsets A ⊆ B ⊆ N , Pmax(A) is a reﬁnement of
the restriction of Pmax(B) to A, then for all superadditive set function v on
2N , the restricted game v is still superadditive on 2N .
Proof. Suppose A ∩B = ∅ (A,B ⊆ N). Then we have:
(44) v(A ∪B) =
∑
C∈Pmax(A∪B)
v(C) =
∑
C∈Pmax(A∪B)
v((C ∩A) ∪ (C ∩B)).
As C ∩A and C ∩B are disjoint and v is superadditive, (44) implies:
(45) v(A ∪B) ≥
∑
C∈Pmax(A∪B)
(v(C ∩A) + v(C ∩B)) .
As Pmax(A) (resp. Pmax(B)) is a reﬁnement of Pmax(A ∪ B), for every
C ∈ Pmax(A ∪ B) such that C ∩ A = ∅ (resp. C ∩ B = ∅), C ∩ A (resp.
C ∩ B) is a disjoint union of blocks of Pmax(A) (resp. Pmax(B)). As v is
superadditive, we obtain:
(46)
v(A ∪B) ≥
∑
C∈Pmax(A∪B)
⎡
⎣ ∑
F⊆C∩A,F∈Pmax(A)
v(F ) +
∑
F⊆C∩B,F∈Pmax(B)
v(F )
⎤
⎦
which yields:
(47) v(A ∪B) ≥
∑
F∈Pmax(A)
v(F ) +
∑
F∈Pmax(B)
v(F ) = v(A) + v(B).
Therefore v is superadditive.
Corollary 11. If G = (N,E) is a forest then superadditivity is inherited
from v to v.
17
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.59
Proof. For a given B ⊆ N , we denote by Σ(B) ⊆ E(B) the maximal subset
of edges which realizes the minimum in the deﬁnition of the strength of
the subgraph GB induced by B. As GB is a forest, e ∈ Σ(B) if and only
if u(e) = mine′∈E(B) u(e
′
). Suppose now A ⊆ B ⊆ N . We have either
Σ(B) ∩ E(A) = Σ(A) or Σ(B) ∩ E(A) = ∅. Pmax(A) is the partition of
A corresponding to the components of the subgraph (A,E(A) \ Σ(A)). If
two elements of A are connected by a path γ in the subgraph (A,E(A) \
Σ(A)), then they are also connected by γ in the subgraph (B,E(B)\Σ(B)).
Therefore Pmax(A) is a subdivision of the restriction of Pmax(B) to A and
the result is a consequence of Theorem 10.
Applying successively Theorems 9 and 10 we obtain:
Corollary 12. If for all unanimity game uS, uS is superadditive, then for all
superadditive function v, v is superadditive. In particular inheritance of the
convexity for all unanimity games implies inheritance of the superadditivity.
The graph represented in Figure 9 shows that we do not have inheritance
of the superadditivity in general, even if all weights are equal to 1.
1 2
3
5 4
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5 e6
Figure 9:
We set A = {1, 2, 3, 4} and B = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We then have Pmax(B) =
{{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}} and Pmax(A) = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}}. Therefore Pmax(A)
is not a reﬁnement of the restriction of Pmax(B) to A and Theorem 9 proves
that there is no inheritance of the superadditivity.
Now we present a general counterexample to the inheritance of convexity.
Let us consider i ∈ N and A ⊆ B ⊆ N \ {i}. We suppose GB has two
connected components GB1 and GB2 . Furthermore we suppose A = A1∪A2
with A1 ⊆ B1 and A2 ⊂ B2. We consider the graph formed by GB plus an
edge e = {i, j} with j ∈ A1, represented in Figure 10. We suppose that the
i j
e A1
B1
A2
B2
Figure 10:
edge-weights are so that the following inequalities are satisﬁed:
(48) u(e) < σ(GB2) < σ(GB1) ≤ σ(GA1) < σ(GA2)
18
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As u(e) < σ(GB2) = σ(GB) and u(e) < σ(GA1) = σ(GA) and j ∈ A1, we
have v(B∪{i}) = v(B1)+v(B2)+v(i) and v(A∪{i}) = v(A1)+v(A2)+v(i).
As σ(GB2) < σ(GB1), we have Pmax(B) = Pmax(B2) ∪ {B1}. We denote by
{B2,1, B2,2, . . . , B2,N2} the partition Pmax(B2). Therefore we have v(B) =
v(B1)+
∑N2
q=1 v(B2,q). In the same way, we denote by {A1,1, A1,2, . . . , A1,N1}
the partition Pmax(A1) and obtain v(A) =
∑N1
p=1 v(A1,p) + v(A2). If v is
convex, we have v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) ≥ v(A∪ {i})− v(A), which is equivalent
to:
(49) v(B2)−
N2∑
q=1
v(B2,q) ≥ v(A1)−
N1∑
p=1
v(A1,p).
Taking for v the unanimity game uA1 , (49) reduces to 0 ≥ 1, which shows
that convexity is not inherited.
We illustrate this general counterexample with the situation represented
in Figure 11. We suppose:
(50) u2 = u3 < u4 < u1.
We deﬁne A1 = B1 = {v1, v2}, A2 = {v5}, B2 = {v4, v5}, A = A1 ∪
A2 and B = B1 ∪ B2. According to (50), we have u2 = u3 < σ(B2) =
v1 v2 i v4 v5
e1 e2 e3 e4
A1 = B1
A2
B2
Figure 11:
u4 < σ(A1) = σ(B1) = u1. Therefore v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B1) + v(B2) + v(i),
v(B) = v(B1) + v(A2) + v(v4), v(A ∪ {i}) = v(A1) + v(A2) + v(i) and
v(A) = v(A2) + v(v1) + v(v2). Then v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i})− v(A)
is equivalent to:
(51) v(B2)− v(A2)− v(v4) ≥ v(A1)− v(v1)− v(v2).
Taking v = uA1 , (51) reduces to 0 ≥ 1 which is a contradiction. Therefore
v is not convex.
6 Suﬃcient conditions
Let F be the family of connected subsets of N . Henceforth G will be a
cycle-free graph. We will now prove that the preceding necessary conditions
are also suﬃcient in this case.
19
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.59
Theorem 13. Let G = (N,E) be a cycle-free graph and let u : E → IR+
be a weight function on the set E of edges. For every F-convex game v on
N , the restricted game v associated with v is F-convex if and only if the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. (Convexity condition) For all paths γ = {e1, e2, . . . , em} in G and for
all i, j, k such that 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ m, we have uj ≤ max(ui, uk).
2. (Branching condition) For all stars Sn, n ≥ 3, with edges e1, e2, . . . , en,
the weights satisfy u1 ≤ u2 = u3 = . . . = un after renumbering the
edges if necessary.
Proof. We have already seen in Section 5 that conditions 1 and 2 are neces-
sary. We now prove they are suﬃcient. Let v be a given F-convex game on
N . We ﬁrst prove that, for all A ⊆ B ⊆ N \ {i} and A,B ∈ F , we have:
(52) v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A).
We will consider Pmax(A) = {A1, A2, . . . , Ap} and Pmax(B) = {B1, B2, . . . , Bq}.
We begin with the special case A = ∅. We have to prove:
(53) v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(i)
for all B ⊆ N \ {i}.
Case 1 We suppose there is no edge linking i with a node in B, i.e.,
E(B ∪ {i}) = E(B). Thus the edges of minimal weight in E(B ∪ {i}) are in
E(B) and Pmax(B∪{i}) = Pmax(B)∪{i}. Therefore v(B∪{i}) = v(B)+v(i)
and (53) is satisﬁed.
Case 2 There is an edge between i and B. As B is connected, there exists
only one edge e = {i, j} with j ∈ B otherwise there would be a cycle in G.
We have to consider diﬀerent subcases according to the weight u(e) of e.
Case 2.1 u(e) > σ(B) = mine′∈E(B) u(e
′
). If we suppose j ∈ B1, then
Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {B1 ∪ {i}, B2, . . . , Bq}. Therefore we have v(B ∪ {i}) =
v(B1 ∪ {i}) +
∑q
l=2 v(Bl). As v is superadditive, we obtain v(B ∪ {i}) ≥
v(B1) + v(i) +
∑q
l=2 v(Bl) = v(B) + v(i).
Case 2.2. u(e) = σ(B) = mine′∈E(B) u(e
′
). Then Pmax(B ∪ {i}) =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bq, {i}} and v(B ∪ {i}) =
∑q
l=1 v(Bl) + v(i) = v(B) + v(i).
Case 2.3 u(e) < σ(B) = mine′∈E(B) u(e
′
). Then u(e) = σ(B ∪ {i}),
Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {B, {i}} and v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B) + v(i). As v is super-
additive, we have v(B) = v(B1∪B2∪ . . .∪Bm) ≥
∑m
l=1 v(Bl) = v(B). Thus
v(B ∪ {i}) ≥ v(B) + v(i).
Therefore in these three cases (53) is satisﬁed.
We consider now the case A = ∅.
Case 3.1 We suppose there is no edge linking i with a node in B. As A ⊆ B
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there is also no edge between i and A. We are for A and B in the situation
of Case 1. Therefore v(B ∪{i}) = v(B)+ v(i), v(A∪{i}) = v(A)+ v(i) and
v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) = v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A).
Case 3.2 There is an edge e = {i, j} with j ∈ B \ A. Case 2 applies to B,
v(B∪{i})−v(B) ≥ v(i). As j /∈ A, Case 1 applies to A, v(A∪{i})−v(A) =
v(i) and therefore v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i})− v(A).
Case 3.3 There is an edge e = {i, j} with j ∈ A. Then we have several
subcases to consider.
Case 3.3.1 We suppose j ∈ A and u(e) > mine′∈E(A) u(e
′
) = σ(A) ≥
σ(B) = mine′∈E(B) u(e
′
). We are for A and B in a situation similar to case
2.1. If we suppose j ∈ A1 ∩B1 then Pmax(A∪ {i}) = {A1 ∪ {i}, A2, . . . , Ap}
and Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {B1 ∪ {i}, B2, . . . , Bq}. As in case 2.1, we have:
(54) v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) = v(A1 ∪ {i}) − v(A1)
and
(55) v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) = v(B1 ∪ {i}) − v(B1).
As A ⊆ B and as G is a forest, we have Σ(B)∩E(A) = ∅ or Σ(B)∩E(A) =
Σ(A). Therefore A1 ⊆ B1 and by the convexity of v we have:
(56) v(B1 ∪ {i}) − v(B1) ≥ v(A1 ∪ {i}) − v(A1).
Using (54) and (55), (56) is equivalent to v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i})−
v(A). Let us observe that we have used the supermodularity of v and not
only the superadditivity as in the preceding cases.
Case 3.3.2 We now suppose j ∈ A and u(e) = σ(A) ≥ σ(B). Then,
applying cases 2.1 and 2.2 to B, we have v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) ≥ v(i). We can
now apply the case 2.2 to A and we have v(A∪{i})−v(A) = v(i). Therefore
we obtain v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A).
Case 3.3.3 We now suppose j ∈ A and:
(57) σ(A) > u(e) > σ(B).
We will see this case cannot occur in fact. Let γ1 be a path in GA, γ1 =
(e1, e2, . . . , em) such that u(e1) = σ(A) and j is an end-vertex of em. Sim-
ilarly let γ2 be a path in GB , γ2 = (e
′
1, e
′
2, . . . , e
′
r) such that u(e
′
1) = σ(B)
and j is an end-vertex of e
′
r. The convexity condition applied to the path
j i
e1 e2 em
e
′
1 e
′
2
e
′
r
e
Figure 12:
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γ1 ∪ {e} and (57) imply u(em) ≤ max(u(e1), u(e)) = u(e1) = σ(A). As
em ∈ E(A), u(em) = σ(A) and using again (57), we obtain:
(58) u(em) > u(e).
The convexity condition applied to the path γ2 ∪ {e} and (57) imply:
(59) u(e
′
r) ≤ max(u(e
′
1), u(e)) = u(e).
If em = e
′
r then, from (58) and (59), we get a contradiction. If now em = e
′
r,
the branching condition for the three edges em, e
′
r, e and (58) imply u(em) =
u(e
′
r) > u(e) contradicting (59). Therefore (57) does not occur and we have
proved the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Let us consider a cycle-free graph G = (N,E) and an edge-
weight function u satisfying the convexity conditions 1) and 2) of Theorem
13. If A and B are connected, A ⊆ B ⊆ N \{i}, j ∈ A∩B and e := {i, j} ∈
E, then either u(e) ≥ σ(A) ≥ σ(B) or σ(A) ≥ σ(B) ≥ u(e).
We have now to consider the two last cases corresponding to σ(A) ≥
u(e) = σ(B) and σ(A) ≥ σ(B) > u(e). To solve these remaining cases, we
need the following result.
Lemma 15. Let us consider A ⊆ B ⊆ N and {B1, B2, . . . , Bp} a partition
of B. Then, for every supermodular function v on N we have:
(60) v(B)−
p∑
i=1
v(Bi) ≥ v(A) −
p∑
i=1
v(Bi ∩A).
Proof of Lemma 15. By the deﬁnition of supermodularity, we have for every
i ∈ [1, p], v(A ∪Bi) + v(A ∩Bi) ≥ v(A) + v(Bi). Adding these inequalities,
we obtain:
(61)
p∑
i=1
v(A ∪Bi) +
p∑
i=1
v(A ∩Bi) ≥ p v(A) +
p∑
i=1
v(Bi).
But (A ∪B1) ∩ (A ∪B2) = A ∪ (B1 ∩B2) = A ∪ ∅ = A, therefore supermo-
dularity still implies v(A ∪ B1 ∪ B2) + v(A) ≥ v(A ∪ B1) + v(A ∪ B2). We
can iterate. Suppose by induction:
(62) v(A ∪ (∪ki=1Bi)) + (k − 1)v(A) ≥
k∑
i=1
v(A ∪Bi).
By supermodularity, we have v(A ∪ (∪ki=1Bi) ∪ Bk+1) + v(A) ≥ v(A ∪
(∪ki=1Bi)) + v(A ∪ Bk+1). Adding this last inequality to (62) we obtain
v(A ∪ (∪k+1i=1 Bi)) + k v(A) ≥
∑k+1
i=1 v(A ∪Bi). For k = p, (62) becomes:
(63) v(B) + (p − 1)v(A) ≥
p∑
i=1
v(A ∪Bi).
(61) and (63) imply (60).
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The following lemma gives a simple condition ensuring Pmax(A) is in-
duced by Pmax(B).
Lemma 16. Let us consider a cycle-free graph G = (N,E), and A ⊆ B ⊆ N
such that σ(A) = σ(B). Then Pmax(A) is the restriction of Pmax(B) to A
and therefore, for all supermodular function v:
(64) v(B)− v(B) ≥ v(A)− v(A).
Proof. We have to prove for every component Bk of Pmax(B) with Bk∩A =
∅, that Bk ∩ A is a component Ak of Pmax(A). Let α0 be a ﬁxed vertex of
A ∩ Bk and Ak be the component of Pmax(A) which contains α0. We will
prove A∩Bk = Ak. As σ(A) = σ(B), Σ(A) = E(A)∩Σ(B). Let now α1 be
another vertex of Ak and γ be a path in Ak from α0 to α1. Each edge e of γ
is in E(A) \Σ(A) and therefore satisﬁes u(e) > σ(A). As σ(A) = σ(B) and
A ⊆ B, each edge e of γ is in E(B) and satisﬁes u(e) > σ(B). Therefore γ
is a path from α0 to α1 in B and therefore α1 ∈ Bk. That is :
(65) Ak ⊆ A ∩Bk.
Let now α1 be a vertex in A ∩Bk. As A is connected, there exists a path γ
from α0 to α1 in A and possibly another one γ
′
from α0 to α1 in Bk. But
as G has no cycle γ = γ
′
and γ is a path in A ∩Bk. For each edge e of γ, e
is in E(A) and in E(B) \ Σ(B), that is u(e) > σ(B). As σ(A) = σ(B), we
have also u(e) > σ(A) and therefore e ∈ E(A) \ Σ(A). Thus γ is a path of
a component of Pmax(A). As α0 ∈ Ak, γ is a path in Ak and then α1 ∈ Ak.
That is:
(66) A ∩Bk ⊆ Ak.
Following (65) and (66), we have shown A ∩ Bk = Ak. Lemma 15 implies
(64).
We can now achieve the proof of the convexity of v. In the two remaining
subcases we have:
(67) u(e) ≤ σ(B) ≤ σ(A).
We can ﬁrst prove that in fact we necessarily have σ(A) = σ(B). Let e1
(resp. e2) be an edge of E(A) (resp. E(B)) such that u(e1) = σ(A) (resp.
u(e2) = σ(B)). As A and B are connected and as j ∈ A ∩B, there exists a
path γ1 (resp. γ2) in GA (resp. in GB) such that its ﬁrst edge is e1 (resp.
e2) and its last edge denoted by e
′
1 (resp. e
′
2) ends at j. Adding the edge
e to γ1 (resp. γ2) we obtain the paths γ1 ∪ {e} and γ2 ∪ {e} ending at i as
represented in Figure 13. (67) implies e is an edge of smallest weight in both
paths γ1∪{e} and γ2∪{e}. Hence the convexity property of the edge-weights
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j i
e2
e
′
2
e
e1
e
′
1
Figure 13:
of a path in G implies the edge-weights are non-increasing along the paths
γ1 ∪ {e} and γ2 ∪ {e}. Therefore we have σ(A) = u(e1) ≥ u(e′1) ≥ σ(A).
Thus equality holds everywhere and we obtain:
(68) u(e1) = u(e
′
1) = σ(A).
In the same way, we have:
(69) u(e2) = u(e
′
2) = σ(B).
Using (68) and (69), (67) is equivalent to:
(70) u(e
′
1) ≥ u(e
′
2) ≥ u(e).
If e
′
1 = e
′
2 then it results from (68) and (69) that σ(A) = σ(B). If e
′
1 = e
′
2,
the branching condition applied to the edges e
′
1, e
′
2, e and (70) imply:
(71) u(e
′
1) = u(e
′
2) ≥ u(e).
(68), (69) and (71) imply σ(A) = σ(B). We have proved the following
lemma:
Lemma 17. Let us consider a cycle-free graph G = (N,E) and an edge-
weight function u satisfying the convexity conditions 1) and 2) of Theorem
13. If A and B are connected, A ⊆ B ⊆ N \ {i}, j ∈ A and e := {i, j} ∈ E,
and σ(A) ≥ σ(B) ≥ u(e), then σ(A) = σ(B).
Case 3.3.4 Let us hereafter assume that u(e) < σ(B) = σ(A). Then
Pmax(A ∪ {i}) = {A, {i}}, Pmax(B ∪ {i}) = {B, {i}}, and therefore v(A ∪
{i}) = v(A) + v(i) and v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B) + v(i). Then the inequality
v(B∪{i})− v(B) ≥ v(A∪{i})− v(A) becomes equivalent to v(B)− v(B) ≥
v(A) − v(A). As σ(A) = σ(B), Lemma 16 implies that this last inequality
is satisﬁed.
Case 3.3.5 It only remains to consider the case where j ∈ A, and u(e) =
σ(B) = σ(A). Then Pmax(A ∪ {i}) = Pmax(A) ∪ {i} and Pmax(B ∪ {i}) =
Pmax(B)∪{i}. Therefore v(A∪{i}) = v(A)+v(i) and v(B∪{i}) = v(B)+v(i)
and the supermodularity property v(B ∪ {i})− v(B) = v(A∪ {i})− v(A) =
v(i) is trivially satisﬁed.
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Let us observe that, as G has no cycle, if v is superadditive, v is super-
additive using Corollary 11. Hence if A and B are connected and A∩B = ∅
we still have v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B). For all connected subsets A and B
of N , we have v(A∪B)+ v(A∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) (assuming v is F-convex
and superadditive).
7 Shapley value
We now investigate the computation of the Shapley value of the game v in
the case of cycle-free graphs. We assume that G = (N,E) is a tree (results
easily extend to forests). To compute the Shapley value, we have to compute
v(S∪i)−v(S) for every S ⊆ N \i and every i ∈ N . Let us ﬁx i ∈ N . Several
cases occur.
1. S, S ∪ i are connected. Since G is a tree, it follows that there is a
unique edge e = {i, j} linking i to S. Put Pmax(S) = {S1, . . . , Sk}
with S1  j and u0 the minimal weight in S. Then:
v(S ∪ i)− v(S) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
v(i) + v(S) − v(S1)− · · · − v(Sk), if u(e) < u0
v(i), if u(e) = u0
v(S1 ∪ i)− v(S1), if u(e) > u0.
2. S is connected but not S ∪ i. Then there is no edge between i and a
node of S. Therefore:
v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = v(i).
3. S is not connected but S ∪ i is. Let S1, . . . , Sk be the connected
components of S. Then there are edges {i, j1}, . . . , {i, jk} from i
to each S1, . . . , Sk, with weights u1, . . . , uk, assuming w.l.o.g. u1 ≤
u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uk, and u0 is the minimal weight on S. Put Pmax(Sl) =
{Sl,1, . . . , Sl,pl}, l = 1, . . . , k with Sl,1  jl. Then
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
v(S1,1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk,1 ∪ i)− v(S1,1)− · · · − v(Sk,1)
if u0 < u1∑m
r=1 v(Sr) + v(Sm+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk ∪ i)−
∑k
r=1
∑pr
s=1 v(Sr,s)
if u1 = · · · = um < min(u0, um+1)
v(Sm+1,1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk,1 ∪ i)− v(Sm+1,1)− · · · − v(Sk,1)
if u1 = · · · = um = u0 < um+1.
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4. S, S∪i are not connected. Let S1, . . . , Sk be the connected components
of S. If i is not linked to any of the S1, . . . , Sk, then
v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = v(i).
Assume now w.l.o.g. that i is linked to S1, . . . , Sl, with u1 ≤ · · · ≤ ul
and same notation as above:
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
v(S1,1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sl,1 ∪ i)− v(S1,1)− · · · − v(Sl,1)
if u0 < u1∑m
r=1 v(Sr) + v(Sm+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sl ∪ i)−
∑l
r=1
∑pr
s=1 v(Sr,s)
if u1 = · · · = um < min(u0, um+1)
v(Sm+1,1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sl,1 ∪ i)− v(Sm+1,1)− · · · − v(Sl,1)
if u1 = · · · = um = u0 < um+1.
It turns out that Case 4 includes all the others, provided we allow for l = 0
and m = l. Therefore, we have an explicit expression of the Shapley value
for trees.
A player i is called a dummy player in a game (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S) + v({i}) for every S ⊆ N \ i.
Proposition 18. If there exists a dummy player i for v, then either {i} has
degree at most 1, or all players are dummy for v.
Proof. Suppose i is dummy for v. Then for any S ⊆ N \ i,
(72) v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) = v(S) + v({i}).
According to case 2 above, this happens if there is no edge from i to S.
Therefore, one possibility is that i has no edge, i.e., it has degree 0. Suppose
then that this is not the case. Then there exist, say m edges adjacent to
i, denoted by {i, j1}, . . . , {i, jm} with weight u1, . . . , um. According to case
4, only the 3d equation with m = l permits to get v(S ∪ i) − v(S) = v(i),
which means that u1 = u2 = · · · = um = mine∈E(S) u(e).
Claim: any edge in the graph has same weight u1 if m > 1.
Indeed, take any edge e = {k, l} in E. If k or l = i, then we know
already that u(e) = u1. Suppose now there exists p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
k or l = jp and consider S = {k, l}. Then imposing (72) for S shows that
u(e) = u1 is the only possibility. Suppose ﬁnally that both k, l diﬀer from
i, j1, . . . , jm. If there is no edge linking j1 to k or l, let us take S = {j1, k, l}.
The partition of S is the partition in singletons since {k, l} is not connected
with j1. Therefore to satisfy (72), the partition of S ∪ {i} must also be in
singletons, which implies that u(e) = u1. If there is an edge between j1 and
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k or l, then, as the graph is cycle free, there is no edge linking k or l to jp
for p ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Taking now S = {j2, k, l} we still get u(e) = u1.
Now if all weights are equal, v is additive, therefore all players are
dummy.
8 Conclusion
All preceding games are point games on the set N of vertices of G. Borm,
Owen and Tijs in 1990 [3] have introduced arc games on the set E of edges
of G and the position value. We could also consider arc games in the same
spirit, by substituting to the partition into connected components the par-
tition associated with the strength of the graph. Aziz et al. [2] have in-
vestigated some properties of the wiretapping game associated with a given
graph. The value of this game is precisely equal to the reciprocal of the
strength of the graph. Using the strength of the subgraphs they construct
a prime partition of the set of edges which is of main interest to analyse the
wiretapping game. By means of this prime partition we could also construct
for a given arc game v on E a new restricted game. It would be interesting
to study inheritance of superadditivity and convexity for this type of games.
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